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assess the effect on acceptability of socioeconomic characteristics, environmental attitudes, social 
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show that policy design matters for acceptability, in particular earmarking for environmental purposes, 
and find evidence of an effect of labeling, “climate contribution” leading under some circumstances to 
larger acceptability than “carbon tax”. We infer that proper policy design coupled with effective 
communication on the effects of carbon taxes may lead to a substantial improvement in acceptability. 
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1 Introduction
International negotiations have aimed to stabilize greenhouse gases concentrations at
levels that would prevent dangerous interferences with the climate system. However,
there is increasingly evidence showing that current mitigation eﬀorts are by large not
enough (UNEP 2013). This result comes as no surprise. Despite economists assessed
their theoretical cost-eﬀectiveness long time ago (cf. e.g. Baumol and Oates 1971),
powerful policy instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions such as carbon taxes are
rather barely implemented (Baranzini and Carattini 2013). A growing strand of literature
addresses the political economy of carbon taxes by looking at the power of lobbying (cf.
e.g. Godal and Holtsmark 2001; Felder and Schleiniger 2002; Kirchgassner and Schneider
2003; Sterner 2007; Spash and Lo 2012). Instead, public acceptability is less explored.
Finding publicly acceptable solutions for decarbonizing our economy is however a clear
priority (Metcalf 2009). With this aim, we conduct a survey on over 300 individuals from
the Canton of Geneva, Switzerland, between December 2012 and January 2013.
The context of Switzerland is indeed of particular interest. Switzerland lobbies beside
the European Union in the post-Kyoto negotiations, urging for ambitious agreements.
However, since its climate policy can be continuously challenged through the instruments
of semi-direct democracy, the gap between government's targets and feasible policies
may be very large. Following the public rejection of three energy-tax proposals in 2000,
Switzerland adopted a climate strategy based on voluntary agreements and only in the
late 2000s introduced a carbon tax, but covering only heating fuels (cf. Thalmann 2004;
Baranzini et al. 2004)1. After that Switzerland missed its objective of CO2 emissions
reduction in 2012, the carbon tax rate was revised upward, but an extension of the tax
base to all fuels may be desirable to reach the more ambitious abatement targets currently
under consideration .
∗Corresponding author: stefano.carattini@hesge.ch. Phone: +41-22-388-18-86. A. Baranzini: an-
drea.baranzini@hesge.ch.
†Haute école de gestion de Genève, HES-SO // University of Applied Sciences Western Switzerland,
7 route de Drize, 1227 Carouge (Geneva), Switzerland.
‡Departament de Teoria Econòmica, Universitat de Barcelona, Av. Diagonal 696, 08034 Barcelona,
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1The tax exists since 2008. The current tax rate is 60 CHF/tonCO2, but the government can increase
it up to 120 CHF/ton CO2 if deemed necessary. As of March 2014, 1 CHF ≈ 1.1 USD ≈ 0.8 EUR. Two
thirds of revenues are redistributed lump-sum to households and through lower social contributions to
ﬁrms. The remaining third is allocated to ﬁnance energy-eﬃciency investments in the building sector.
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Actually, the debate on Swiss energy and climate policy may reopen sooner than
expected. First, semi-direct democracy allows also for bottom-up proposals. For instance,
a pending popular initiative seeks the full replacement of the 8% VAT by an energy
tax2. Second, in the aftermath of Fukushima, Switzerland decided to start to phase-out
nuclear energy. Currently, 40% of electricity is from nuclear sources, which implies very
low carbon emissions from electricity in international comparison and little room for
maneuver to replace nuclear energy without increasing carbon emissions. This is likely
to imply the need for substantial reductions in consumption (Baranzini et al. 2013).
Third, the Swiss government recently reported the need of additional funding for highway
maintenance and thus proposed to increase fuel taxes.
Increments of energy prices are then expected from both higher taxation of fossil fuels
and reforms in the electricity market. Consequences on poor and rural households repre-
sent a public concern and call for social cushioning. Carefully designing the instruments
of climate policy may prove crucial in this challenging context. Indeed, revenues from a
carbon tax may look as an attractive option for funding the Swiss transition towards a
low-carbon economy, provided that suﬃcient political support is ensured.
The main aim of this paper is to determine which policy features impact acceptability.
We are interested in determining whether citizens in Geneva show a positive demand
for climate change mitigation, depending on socioeconomic characteristics and policy's
perceptions, and what policy design may have an impact on carbon tax acceptability.
Indeed, policymakers can hardly modify their population composition, but do have the
ability to design eﬀective and acceptable policies. The structure of the paper is the
following. Section 2 describes the survey, sample characteristics and descriptive statistics.
Econometric results are discussed in section 3, section 4 concludes.
2 Survey design and data description
2.1 Qualitative survey
To deﬁne the questions of the quantitative survey, we ﬁrst administer a qualitative sur-
vey taking between 20 to 30 minutes to a small sample of 40 adults living in the Canton
of Geneva. The survey is organized around 5 open questions, conceived to understand
individual's perceptions and concerns regarding climate policy and carbon taxes3. Re-
current answers indicate that private actions (e.g. improvements in energy eﬃciency)
are preferred to public intervention, the latter being barely mentioned as a possible way
out to curb energy consumption and emissions. When interviewers introduce the role
of the public sector, the general opinion is to limit intervention to communication and
education (i.e. suasion). Market instruments are mentioned only by few, and subsidies
(e.g. for public transportation) are by large preferred to taxes, in line with Cherry et al.
(2012).
When asked about future energy prices, most individuals expect an upward trend.
We observe that respondents are well informed about the nuclear phasing-out program
as announced by the Swiss government a few months before. Social cushioning for low-
income households receives general support in the follow-up questions asking for the
consequences of the expected price increases. Respondents seem however not particularly
concerned by the eﬀects on rural households, arguably because in the speciﬁc case of
2Another initiative seeks more in general to reduce Switzerland's carbon footprint through the
buildup of a green economy. A third one aims at improving substantially energy eﬃciency and re-
placing energy from fossil sources with electricity. All these initiatives are likely to be submitted to the
population by the end of 2015.
3The full set of transcripts of the qualitative survey is available by the authors upon request.
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Geneva the countryside hosts high-income households attracted by calmness, green spaces
and possibly interesting ﬁscal conditions.
Regarding the possible implementation of a carbon tax, respondents often state that
at a ﬁrst sight there are no conditions under which they would accept a generalized
carbon tax, many feeling that they are already paying enough taxes. However, a follow-
up question shows that the tax may enjoy moderate support if any potential inequality
on household's income distribution would be oﬀset. Frequent critics to the tax include
distrust in the government and a presumed ineﬀectiveness of the carbon tax in changing
behavior. We also realize that people are relatively badly informed about the existence
of a tax on heating fuels.
We also ask how tax revenues should be used, for instance to ﬁnance environmental
projects, social cushioning programs or refunded through tax rebates. Most respondents
support the use of ﬁscal revenues in the environmental domain, also when the diﬀer-
ent recycling options are not explicitly mentioned. Actually, respondents are generally
disconcerted about the possibility of using the revenues of an environmental tax for some-
thing unrelated to the environment. Social cushioning is also considered as important,
but it seems that the way of ﬁnancing it should make abstraction of environmental tax
revenues. Finally, respondents would like to pay fewer income taxes, but they do not be-
lieve that the government would renounce to the opportunity of collecting new revenues
(see Hahn 2009).
2.2 Quantitative survey
2.2.1 Sample properties
From December 2012 to January 2013, we surveyed through face-to-face interviews a
sample of 400 adults living in the Canton of Geneva with a pre-tested questionnaire,
supported by the qualitative analysis. To test for possible labeling eﬀects, we adminis-
tered two types of questionnaires: half of the sample received a questionnaire with the
wording carbon tax (hereafter CT), while the remaining with climate contribution
(CC)4. Indeed, prospect theory shows that in presence of uncertainty individuals may
want to take larger risks than what would be rationally justiﬁed, due to loss aversion
(Kahneman and Tversky 2000). Individuals may thus prefer the status quo instead of
dealing with climate change, in spite of the large risks and a positive expected value of
climate change mitigation. However, if the original state of aﬀairs is perceived as such
that the current climate quality is at risk, individuals could accept the policy to avoid a
loss in climate quality (see Kahneman and Tversky 2000 and Geisendorf 2013). In this
sense, a good way to market carbon taxes may be to refer to a contribution for climate
conservation, i.e. indicating that the climate is at risk and the planet may face a potential
loss in climate quality.
Once eliminated all non-valid questionnaires, our sample is composed by 338 obser-
vations, 158 in the CT and 180 in the CC sub-samples. Each questionnaire possesses the
same number of questions (20), with exactly the same framing, except for the substitution
of the wording carbon tax with climate contribution.
Concerning external validity, the composition of the sample is fairly representative
of Geneva population, except for a slight under- (over-)representation of retired (young)
and low-educated individuals. The survey also identiﬁes members of environmental orga-
nizations (hereafter green members, 14% of the sample) and political positioning (coded
as left, center, right and no positioning), and investigates individual's self-reported level
4The questionnaires are available by the authors upon request.
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of environmental concern. It also asks whether respondents generally trust their govern-
ment (93%) and if they are aware of the existing CO2 tax on heating fuels (only 40%).
This lack of awareness concerning current taxation conﬁrms the preliminary evidence
provided by the qualitative analysis and may be explained by the limited salience of
both taxation and lump-sum refund to households through reduced healthcare bills.
Based on the socioeconomic characteristics of Table 1, we compare the CT and CC
sub-samples. We do not ﬁnd any statistical diﬀerences in the averages of these variables,
except in the case of years of education (16 with CT compared to 15.59 with CC) and
the number of adults in the households (2.15 with CT and 2.44 with CC).
2.2.2 Variables and descriptive statistics
In what follows, we brieﬂy outline a selection of questions and the relative descriptive
statistics. Some of them are then used as variables in the econometric analysis. Table 2
reviews the ﬁrst set of questions targeting energy behavior and policy in general terms.
Energy consumption The entry questions test whether respondents care of their
consumption of energy, giving diﬀerent options in an attempt do reduce biased answers.
The majority of respondents cares of its consumption, but in a limited way. Only a
fraction of the sample (20%) considers to be very attentive. Since for most individuals
saving money is the main reason to monitor energy consumption, we may conclude that
current monetary incentives are too low. Indeed, only a small proportion of the sample
(7%) considers to have reduced consumption at the maximum of capacity.
Price elasticities Question 3 asks for what price variation (in percentage) respondents
would need to adjust their energy consumption by 10 percent, and thus approximates
price elasticity since ≈∆%q∆%p . On average, we obtain a price elasticity for gasoline of
-0.51, for electricity of -0.60 and for heating fuels of -0.59. These values mirror relatively
well the estimates for Switzerland of Baranzini and Weber (2013) for gasoline (-0.09 in
the short run and -0.34 in the long run) and of Filippini (2011) for electricity (short-
run price elasticity around -0.7), despite they reﬂect stated preferences and require an
important cognitive eﬀort as shown by clustering around round values (cf. Figure 1)
and some extreme answers, such as supposedly completely elastic or inelastic individuals
Yet, estimates are very similar if we drop extreme observations or keep only car owners
to compute the elasticity of gasoline. Instead, homeowners have a larger elasticity for
heating fuels (-0.94) than renters (-0.49), which is however in line with the literature on
the asymmetric information between tenants and landlords (see e.g. Gillingham et al.
2009 for a review).
Public intervention Question 6 discusses the role of the public sector to reduce energy
consumption. Only a tiny fraction of individuals (2%) contend that there is no need to
reduce energy consumption at all. Similarly, only 3% believe that energy consumption
does not need to be regulated. That is, the large majority expects the government to
intervene to curb energy consumption. However, as for the qualitative survey, market
instruments are not the favored tool. Preferences go rather to informational campaign
raising awareness and to funds for public transportation5. Those answers are in line
5Thus, our survey predicted well the strong demand for public transportation revealed by the Swiss
population in the ballot of February 9th 2014, when a credit of 6.4 billions to fund public transport
infrastructures was accepted with 62% of yes-votes (participation at 55%, given the concomitance of
another vote on the freedom of movement between Switzerland and the European Union).
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Figure 1: Own-price energy elasticity: kernel density estimates
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bandwidth as for Gaussian distributions. Elasticities in absolute value.
with the increasing emphasis on integrated approaches leading to a policy-mix composed
by a broader spectrum of instruments and with recent empirical evidence suggesting
that subsidizing public transportation could be an eﬀective way to reduce many road
externalities (cf. e.g. Asensio et al. 2013; Lalive et al. 2013). Communication may also
prove to be eﬀective, but does not necessarily represent a substitute to taxes as suggested
by economic lobbies (see Bürgenmeier et al. 2006 for the Swiss case). According to Nyborg
et al. (2006), moral motivation may be positively aﬀected by information campaigns and
advertising also in presence of carbon taxes. Indeed, normative messages are expected
to be eﬀective when injunctive norms (what one should do) are aligned with descriptive
norms (what others do), i.e. when inﬂuencing the perception that individuals have
of the others' behavior (see below on the role of trust). In practice, policymakers can
intervene e.g by improving public advertisement (see Cialdini 2003) or by rewarding those
agents providing good eﬀorts to reduce their energy consumption (Steg and Vlek 2009).
For instance, in the ﬁeld experiment of Schultz et al. (2007) happy smiles were pasted
on the door of those households that reduced energy consumption, so to spur further
cooperation. Hence, strict policy measures such as carbon taxes may perform better if
coupled with a rise in awareness through eﬀective communication (von Borgstede et al.
2013).
Yet, already at this stage 35% of respondents believe that the Swiss government
should intervene with a broader carbon tax to reduce energy consumption, regardless
of speciﬁc design or social cushioning. We expect this sub-sample to be more likely to
support carbon taxation in the econometric analysis below.
Future energy prices In questions 7 and 8 we look at expectations about future
energy prices. On average the price of gasoline is expected to increase by about 27% in
the next 10 years, which may make sense in real terms assuming stricter climate policy
and reasonable discounting in the oil market. However, the average is driven up by the
last decile which expects price increases from 50% to 100%. As commented by Alcott
(2011), some consumers expect so large increases in future oil prices that it would make
sense to them to trade in future markets. Scarcity is for 93% of respondents a driver of
higher gasoline prices in the next 10 years. The expected price increase for heating fuels
is 18% on average, with the majority of answers lying between +10% and +50%, fairly in
line with the Swiss-German survey of Alberini et al. (2013). If instead prices were to be
interpreted in nominal terms (cf. Anderson et al. 2013), the expected real price increase
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would have to be corrected by expected inﬂation.
Interestingly, for a large majority (around 60%) climate policy is also expected to lift
prices for all energy vectors. Hence, we remark that, although the question introduces
a horizon of 10 years, the ﬁeld for stricter climate policy may be getting ready, in the
sense that people seem to anticipate future policy tightening. However, in the meanwhile
households may not only invest in energy eﬃciency (cf. Alberini et al. 2013) but also take
advantage of current low prices to consume energy-intensive goods, possibly raising the
issue of a demand-driven Green Paradox.
Social cushioning Question 9 focuses on the potential need for social cushioning to
reduce the expected social eﬀects of energy price increases on low-income and rural house-
holds. Not surprisingly, raising awareness (73%) and ﬁnancing public transportation
(61%) are the preferred options, in line with answers at question 6. Actually, subsidizing
public transportation can be an eﬀective way of reducing regressive eﬀects on low-income
households, since they are likely to enjoy the most a decrease in fare prices (or an increase
in supply).
Regarding ﬁnancial cushioning, answers are similar for subsidies and tax rebates, with
a slight preference for subsidies. However, no majority is reached for any type of direct
social cushioning, indicating that this may not be the priority for citizens in Geneva.
Though, subsidies to low-income households receive a moderate support (38%), whereas
the very low approval for subsidies to rural regions (10%) conﬁrms our priors about the
speciﬁc case of Geneva on this matter.
Carbon taxation We introduce the second set of questions dealing speciﬁcally with
carbon taxation and apply the two labels emphasized above (cf. Table 3). In both
versions of the questionnaire, we introduce the CT/CC by saying that this potential
instrument would have a tax rate of 120 CHF per ton of CO2, implying a price increase
of gasoline by about 15% and of heating fuel about 30%. Despite the majority thinks
that the tax would lead to a reduction in their level of energy consumption, an ample
proportion of respondents (37%) expects no change in their behavior, whereas the share
of individuals pointing to an increase in consumption is non-negligible (see question
10). The latter either represent protest answer or suggest that worries of an intrinsic-
motivation crowding-out may be justiﬁed.
Motivational crowding-out is indeed a hot topic in the ﬁeld of environmental policy,
since the work of psychologists Deci and Ryan (1985). The intuition is that economic
instruments and ﬁnancial compensations may turn out to have counterproductive eﬀects
on intrinsically-motivated agents. That is, ecologists that already provide large eﬀorts
for a given public good in absence of any economic incentive may feel frustrated for being
taxed despite their eﬀorts (no behavior is good enough not to be penalized, Goeschl
and Perino 2012) or less responsible toward the provision of the public good as they may
think that since I pay, I can consume and thus pollute (Bazin et al. 2004).
Some empirical evidence underpins the existence of motivational crowding-out with
external regulation (see e.g. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Ostmann 1998 and Cardenas
et al. 2000), although in the case of climate policy only the experimental evidence of
Goeschl and Perino (2012) is available, with the tax reducing the willingness to buy and
withdraw CO2 emissions permit from the market. Actually, according to Kirchgassner
and Schneider (2003) intrinsic motivation does aﬀect behavior, but only for low-cost
decisions, while for Okey and Wright (2005), drivers enjoy anyway negligible feelings of
responsibility towards those aﬀected by their driving (but see also Bazin et al. 2004,
2005; Heyes and Kapur 2011).
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Interestingly, in our data we ﬁnd no correlation between possible crowding-out and
either the level of attention to energy consumption or the perception of being already
doing a maximum of eﬀorts (questions 1 and 2), thus supporting the interpretation of
strategic answers.
Question 11 enlarges the focus and asks whether people expect the tax to be eﬀective.
A short majority (52%) expects the tax not to be. This descriptive evidence is in line
with much of the literature, which ﬁnds that in general individuals tend to neglect the
incentive eﬀect of environmental taxation (Dresner et al. 2006; Steg et al. 2006; see also
Kallbekken and Aasen 2010; Sælen and Kallbekken 2011). It also shows that people
expect a larger eﬀect on themselves than on the average population, but we cannot
completely rule out strategic voting. We ﬁnd a positive correlation between questions 10
and 11 but not larger than 0.27.
Co-beneﬁts The purpose of question 12 is to test for awareness of co-beneﬁts. To
limit biased answers, respondents are asked to spontaneously mention a list of ancillary
beneﬁts coming to their minds, if any. After mentioning a beneﬁt, people are asked
whether it would be enjoyed by themselves or the society as a whole (or both). About
half of the sample (56%) see better air quality as an ancillary beneﬁt from carbon taxes.
The proportion is lower for congestion issues, health improvements and lower risk of road
accidents. Age and car ownership are both positively but only marginally correlated with
perceiving individual beneﬁts from better health and lower accidents, respectively.
Question 12 thus points to a relatively low awareness of co-beneﬁts, which may need
to be targeted through improved communication, along with primary beneﬁts. Indeed,
most studies providing monetary estimates of co-beneﬁts suggest that they are relatively
conspicuous compared to mitigation costs (see Baranzini and Carattini 2013 for a review).
According to Pittel and Rübbelke (2008), co-beneﬁts may be suﬃciently large to justify
cooperation in international negotiations and lead to binding international agreements,
of course provided that their existence (and magnitude) is recognized.
Labeling may contribute to this issue of communication. We ﬁnd that the number of
co-beneﬁts acknowledged by respondents is statistically higher in the CC sample. Taken
at face value, this descriptive evidence may suggest that climate contribution conveys
a message pointing to a general environmental improvement, which seems to go beyond
CO2 emissions reduction (for which we do not have any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the
frequency of answers).
Disadvantages of carbon taxation The literature acknowledges a series of unwanted
side eﬀects related with carbon taxation. Mainly, it is a matter of competitiveness and
distributional eﬀects (Baranzini et al. 2000). Indeed, despite the evidence points to rather
small competitiveness eﬀects (Mathys and de Melo 2011; see also Ambec et al. 2013),
the role played by the risk of geographical carbon leakage tends to be very important in
the political economy of climate policy (Mathys and de Melo 2011)6.
Distributional eﬀects also represent an important critique to carbon taxes and, with-
out appropriate design, a potential obstacle to its political acceptability (Metcalf 2009).
They regard principally low-income and rural households, which can be more impacted
than others (Baranzini et al. 2000; Zhang and Baranzini 2004)7. Empirical evidence
6That is why international negotiations are often represented as a dilemma-like game. Recent contri-
butions suggest however diﬀerent game-theoretical settings for climate change negotiations, taking into
account e.g. diﬀerent costs of adaptation, local co-beneﬁts (Pittel and Rübbelke 2008) and irreversibility
(Pittel and Rübbelke 2010).
7Here we refer to direct distributional eﬀects, i.e. the direct eﬀect of higher energy prices on house-
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suggests that energy consumption has a positive income elasticity but between 0 and
1, making carbon and energy taxes at least slightly regressive (see e.g. Sterner 2011
on gasoline taxes). Nonetheless, policy-related environmental improvements may beneﬁt
more the poorest households living in environmentally distressed conditions. Of course,
this supposes that individuals are informed about the existence (and magnitude) of local
co-beneﬁts associated with global environmental policies. Rural households are expected
to incur in a larger burden given the limited possibilities of substitution between private
and public transportation in the countryside. Moreover, city dwellers may enjoy larger
beneﬁts from improved environmental quality than citizens living outside the urban areas.
In general, climate policy comes at a cost for all households, abstracting so far from
revenue recycling. Thus, questions 13 and 14 deal with instrument's drawbacks, paying
attention to the impact on the respondent's household and on the society, respectively.
We note that the most generalized fear for respondents (67%) is to be constrained to
reduce the overall level of consumption, due to higher energy prices. Only about a ﬁfth
of the sample considers that the tax would have no negative eﬀects on its household.
Interestingly, expecting lower purchasing power does not necessarily imply a loss of com-
fort. That is, it appears that people in the sample feel that they could live comfortably
even with less purchasing power, although they may not like it. Expecting losses of pur-
chasing power is negatively correlated with the highest income category and expecting
less comfort is positively associated with the lowest income category.
Regarding employment eﬀects, only a small minority (5%) is concerned about the
impact on her job. This makes sense since Geneva hosts mainly tertiary activities and
a very few energy-intensive industries. We also note that at the time of the survey the
level of unemployment in the Canton of Geneva was 5.5%.
Looking at the diﬀerences in averages across the sub-samples, descriptive evidence
seems suggesting that drawbacks are more easily recognized in the CT sub-sample than
with the CC.
We now turn to the eﬀects on society. In line with the literature, regressive ef-
fects seem to represents a real concern (cf. e.g. Thalmann 2004; Bristow et al. 2010;
Kallbekken et al. 2011). This may create the premises for revenue recycling and social
cushioning. Consistently with what presented above, we ﬁnd that only a minority (25%)
cares of distributional eﬀects on rural households. We are instead surprised to see that
only relatively small proportions of respondents are concerned by employment and com-
petitiveness eﬀects. In particular, the number of people concerned by unemployment
issues (11%) is only slightly larger than those concerned by their own job (correlation of
0.46).
Acceptability Question 15 is crucial since it allows to directly test for policy accept-
ability, after discussing policy's advantages and disadvantages. The share of positive
answers is quite high and close to majority (49%). Actually, the approval rate in ques-
tion 15 is very close to the support given to the Energy conservation package in the
the ballot of 2000 (46.6%, cf. Thalmann 2004)8. Comparing the two labels, we ﬁnd
that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence. Hence, it seems so far that framing may matter in
inﬂuencing the perception of pros and cons, but not their balance, i.e. the outcome in
terms of acceptability.
hold's budget, although indirect channels make the issue much more complex (cf. Fullerton 2011). The
same applies to liquidity constraints which may lead ex-ante and ex-post eﬀects to diverge.
8Respondents were also given the Do not know option. However, what we want to assess is the
willingness to accept such a policy and hence consider irresolute respondents as no-voters, although
abstention is always an alternative in ballots. 93 individuals are concerned.
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Social cushioning Question 16 (cf. Table 4) asks what groups of population should
be compensated due to the CT/CC perceived adverse impacts. We compare it with
question 9, which is similar but relative to energy price increases in general. Comparison
for low-income and rural households indicates that the demand for supporting measures
is larger if energy price increases result from climate policy. Respondents seem thus
more sensitive to distributive impacts when they result from a public policy, rather than
from exogenous market forces. A possible interpretation may be that the eﬀects of the
latter are perceived as temporary or less salient since gradual. For instance, salience and
perceived temporariness are supposed to matter in the elasticity of gasoline in Davis and
Kilian (2011), Li et al. (2012), Scott (2012) and Baranzini and Weber (2013), although
contrary evidence is provided by Anderson et al. (2013).
From Table 4, we note that social cushioning is particularly warranted for low-income
households (72% of support), but around 50%-60% of respondents support also compen-
sating measures for older people and large families. Probably administratively burden-
some, cushioning of these two categories is seldom considered in the literature. Instead,
previous studies pay a lot of attention to ﬁrms competitiveness, which appears not to be
a concern for respondents in our sample.
The proportion of people asking for compensation towards high-income households,
is particularly low (18%), as well as for rural households. Societywide refunds, i.e. the
current way of refunding tax revenues from the Swiss carbon tax on heating fuels, seems
not to be the preferred option for our sample, although it represents a simple and cheap
(but also possibly ununderstood) way of reducing regressivity (see e.g. Metcalf 2009;
cf. Pezzey and Jotzo 2013 and Bristow et al. 2010 on tax thresholds). In particular, we
remark that older people are disadvantaged by the current recycling, while answers to
16g would rather justify a speciﬁc aid to this sub-population.
Revenue recycling In question 17 (see Table 4), we propose three ways of revenue
recycling (and give space for an eventual fourth option). Redistribution towards aﬀected
households relates to the previous discussion on distributional eﬀects. Tax rebates would
allow for a double dividend from environmental taxation, by decreasing distortionary
taxes. Earmarking tax revenues for environmental purposes is a recurrent and popular
option in the literature (cf. e.g. Dresner et al. 2006; Steg et al. 2006; Kallbekken and
Aasen 2010; Sælen and Kallbekken 2011). No speciﬁc earmarking, i.e. funding the
general budget, underlies question 15 and represents the ﬁrst best from an economic
perspective (Sælen and Kallbekken 2011).
Respondents are asked to rank the alternatives in decreasing order of preference.
Unsurprisingly, 60% of the respondents would like to see tax revenues used to ﬁnance
environmental projects. Social cushioning comes second, while tax rebates to households
and ﬁrms are supported by a small minority only.
Acceptability conditional on recycling Question 18 retests the level of acceptabil-
ity, but this time conditional on earmarking and revenue recycling. In particular, it asks
whether the respondent would accept a CT/CC if revenues were to be recycled according
to her wish as expressed in question 17 (and detailed in question 16 in the case of social
cushioning). As shown by Table 4, yes-votes reach now 64%, i.e. about 25% more than in
question 15. This result does not surprise, in the light of the ﬁndings of e.g. Kallbekken
et al. (2011). Comparing the two labels, we get 60% versus 67% of yes-votes in favor of
the CC sub-sample. Statistical tests substantiate this diﬀerence, providing support for
the inclusion of the label variable in the econometric analyses below.
This level of support may however be misleading since obtained by assuming that
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the preferred recycling options of each individual are implemented simultaneously. In
the three last columns of Table 5 we thus calculate the acceptability rate assuming that
only one recycling option at time is implemented.
We observe that individuals opting for recycling through green projects and renewable
energy are relatively more willing to accept the carbon tax proposed by the question-
naire in question 15 (55%), whereas those more concerned by social impacts and ﬁscal
neutrality have a lower approval rate (40% and 25%, respectively). When in question
18 earmarking is introduced, the approval rate climbs for all recycling options. There
are again diﬀerences, depending on the recycling option, maybe because those selecting
green projects are particularly concerned by the climate issue, as shown by correlations
with environmental concern, whereas the remaining individuals may seek to limit policy
drawbacks. Although the diﬀerent ways of recycling lead to relatively close acceptance
rate as found in Thalmann (2004), we observe that tax rebate to households and ﬁrms
generate the largest relative increase in acceptance (from 25% to 53%). However, since
this category is chosen by only a small number of respondents relative to the whole
sample, overall yes-votes raise of only 3% (from 47% to 50%). Redistribution towards
most aﬀected households increases acceptability in the whole sample of about 5% (from
47% to 52%). The largest increase in overall acceptance results from using revenues for
ﬁnancing environmental projects and renewable energy (from 47% to 57%).
Tax rate So far, the questionnaire refers to a CT/CC with a tax rate of 120 CHF/tCO2,
causing with full pass-through an increase of about 15% (30%) in the current price of
gasoline (heating fuels). Question 19 asks what would be the highest acceptable CT/CC
tax rate, in terms of energy prices increase. The aim is to measure the intensity of policy
acceptance in terms of willingness-to-pay for climate change mitigation.
Figure 2 displays the distribution of answers using interval mean values, with both
histograms and kernel density. The distribution is bounded by the questionnaire (at 0%
and 30%) and centered in the 5%-10% interval (using interval means, the average is 7%
and the median 7.5%). Neither visual inspection nor statistical tests provide signals of a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between CC and CT.
Albeit a majority supports the tax in question 18, when asked about deﬁning them-
selves the tax rate, respondents tend to indicate lower rates of energy price change than
what proposed the survey. The two results are not necessarily in contradiction. Voters
are supposed to select the closer option to their preferences. For instance, the Norwegian
choice experiment of Sælen and Kallbekken (2011) shows that respondents would prefer
to decrease the current level of environmental taxes, absent earmarking for environmen-
tal purposes (but see also Bristow et al. 2010). Although this explanation may not be
exhaustive, it could suggest to start with a low tax rate and increase it afterward to
improve acceptability (see also Godal and Holtsmark 2001)9.
3 Econometric analysis
3.1 Carbon tax acceptability
In this section we analyze the determinants of carbon tax acceptability (question 15).
Since the outcome variable is Bernoulli, we apply a probit estimation strategy. Model (1)
9However, if the tax path is announced in advance, the issue of a Green Paradox may be raised, for
instance if the tax is introduced in a concerted move with other countries (see Baranzini and Carattini
2013 and Di Maria et al. 2013 for a discussion).
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Figure 2: Tax rate: distribution of answers
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estimates the eﬀect of a vector of independent variables x on the probability of accepting
the carbon tax (or the climate contribution). From Greene (2011):
Prob(Acceptability = 1|x) = F (x, β) (1)
Equation (1) includes both continuous (e.g. number of cars) and dummy variables (e.g. green
membership). In general, the marginal (or partial) eﬀect is given by:
Marginal effect =
∂F (.)
∂x
(2)
which is obtained by multiplying β for the normal density. That is, f(x′βˆ)βˆ = fˆ βˆ. For
dummy variables, the change is discrete. Hence, the partial eﬀect of a dummy d is given as:
Marginal effect = Prob(Acceptability = 1|x¯(d), d = 1)−Prob(Acceptability = 1|x¯(d), d = 0) (3)
where x¯(d) is the mean of all variables but d. The selection of variables proceeds from the
literature. Several socioeconomic factors are possible determinants of demand for environmental
policy in general and climate change mitigation in particular. Among them, we obtain from our
survey data on income, education, age, gender, car holding (as proxy for carbon footprint) and
membership of environmental organizations (as proxy for pro-environmental behavior).
A priori, the eﬀect of income on the acceptability of carbon taxes is ambiguous. Three main
channels relate income with preferences for climate change mitigation. First, if the environment
is a normal good, the higher the income, the larger the demand for environmental quality.
However, the public good characteristics of climate change imply that demand for environmental
quality is likely to be only partially expressed (cf. Roca 2003). Second, slight regressivity as
discussed in section 2 implies that richer individuals are likely to consume less (more) energy in
relative (absolute) terms and thus climate policy would impose on them a lower (larger) relative
(absolute) burden. Third, environmental improvements may favor relatively more low-income
households. Of course, this presumes that individuals are informed about the existence (and
magnitude) of local co-beneﬁts associated with global environmental policies.
Education is supposed to spur acceptability. Since education is a long-run investment, ed-
ucated people may possess a lower discount rate than the average citizen (Bornstein and Lanz
2008). Moreover, educated people may suﬀer of lower informational gaps on climate change
issues. Lack of information could downplay the relative beneﬁts of climate change mitigation (cf.
e.g. Cohen and Viscusi 2012)10.
10Note however that increasing information may instead reinforce existing beliefs leading to a polarized
society (Kahan et al. 2011). Individuals may also be well informed but still skeptical if they do not trust
the information source, e.g. the government (Ricci et al. 2010).
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Age could be a determinant of political acceptability for three reasons. First, we expect the
youngest generations to have larger interest for long-run environmental issues such as climate
change. Second, older people may be relatively less able to adapt to higher energy prices, e.g. by
substituting private with public transportation. Third, older people may also be disadvantaged
by the way revenues are recycled, e.g. by lowering labor costs (Thalmann 2004).
Gender may inﬂuence acceptability as a potential determinant of diﬀerences in risk aversion
and cooperative attitude, with women being perhaps more risk averse and thus less willing to be
exposed to the risk of climate change (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2006).
Car ownership is often used as a proxy for carbon footprint, although Bornstein and Lanz
(2008) contend that the main transport choice for commuting may better mirror everyday carbon
consumption. Carbon footprint is supposed to be negatively associated with the acceptability
of carbon taxes (cf. e.g. Thalmann 2004; Kallbekken and Sælen 2011 but also Diederich and
Goeschl 2013).
Ecologists are expected to be relatively more in favor of climate policy tightening, since it
could provide larger eﬀects than isolated actions (assuming no motivational crowding-out).
Since we know the postal code of each respondent, we can also distinguish individuals living
in an urban environment from those residing in the countryside. Since with carbon taxes rural
households are expected to incur in a relatively larger burden given the limited possibilities of
substitution between private and public transportation and city dwellers are likely to enjoy larger
beneﬁts from improved environmental quality, we would expect the latter to be relatively more
prone to acceptance. Yet, as said, the context of Geneva may represent a speciﬁc case in this
matter.
Table 6 reports estimations results based on marginal eﬀects at median, consistently with the
median voter theorem11. The table reports a selection of variables following a stepwise procedure
excluding variables associated with very large p-values. Many socioeconomic variables are thus
excluded from column (1). For instance, we do not ﬁnd any eﬀect for age (both as a continuous
variable or using speciﬁc groups such as e.g. youth, retired people), gender and location. The
result for age is close to Bornstein and Lanz (2008) and Stadelmann-Steﬀen (2011) but diverges
from other studies of environmental votes such as Thalmann (2004), Sciarini et al. (2007) and
Bornstein and Thalmann (2008). Regarding gender, in Thalmann (2004) a signiﬁcant gender gap
is found only in the level of participation, whereas other ballot-based studies provide signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the preferences for policy (see e.g. Sciarini et al. 2007; Bornstein and Lanz 2008;
Bornstein and Thalmann 2008; Stadelmann-Steﬀen 2011). The eﬀect of location is at odds with
the literature on environmental ballots (e.g. Thalmann 2004; Halbheer et al. 2006; Bornstein
and Thalmann 2008; Bornstein and Lanz 2008) but complies with our expectation given the
particular case of Geneva. Income is also statistically non-signiﬁcant and thus excluded, given
also the many missing values. Although self-selection may be an issue (as remarked in section 4),
the absence of an eﬀect of income ﬁts the theoretical prediction and is in line with the literature
on environmental ballots (see e.g. Deacon and Shapiro 1975; Thalmann 2004; Bornstein and Lanz
2008). Given the descriptive statistics on price elasticity we also test the eﬀect of home ownership
and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect. Political positioning is also far from statistical signiﬁcance, although
its sign is positive for left-winged individuals, positive but smaller for those supporting center
parties and negative for right-winged individuals (compared to no political positioning). At any
rate, causality in this respect may be ambiguous (Kallbekken and Sælen 2011). As opposed to
Stadelmann-Steﬀen (2011), we do not ﬁnd any eﬀect for being unemployed at the time of the
survey. Household size does not aﬀect acceptability either12.
Signiﬁcant variables in column (1) show that the number of cars held by respondents is
11Marginal eﬀects are derivatives computed in diﬀerent ways depending on the assumed underlying
distribution. Probit assumes a normal (Gaussian) distribution for F. We compare marginal eﬀects at
median with marginal eﬀect at mean, average marginal eﬀects, logit (which allows for thicker tails) and
OLS. Marginal eﬀects at mean and average marginal eﬀects are qualitatively unchanged with respect to
the estimates presented in Table 7 (estimates not provided here). We ﬁnd that for most coeﬃcients the
choice of the econometric model has implications for interpretation in terms of magnitude, but not of
sign and signiﬁcance. In the logit model co-beneﬁts turn out to be non-signiﬁcant. The same applies for
OLS. The estimated model includes a heteroscedastic error term i. Standard errors are computed with
the Delta method (cf. Greene 2011).
12All estimations are available by the authors upon request.
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negatively linked with the probability of accepting a carbon tax, whereas green membership and
education have a positive impact. That is, as in Thalmann (2004), it is not only car ownership,
but the number of vehicles that is related to political behavior. Green membership keeps its
signiﬁcance in all speciﬁcations, conﬁrming the laboratory evidence of Loeschel et al. (2013). An
additional year of education is linked with an increased probability of accepting the tax, mirroring
the evidence on ballots (Thalmann 2004; Sciarini et al. 2007; Bornstein and Lanz 2008; Bornstein
and Thalmann 2008; Stadelmann-Steﬀen 2011) and on the demand for climate change mitigation
(see e.g. Roe et al. 2001; Achtnicht 2012; Loeschel et al. 2013).
In column (2) we apply the same stepwise procedure to the general questions on environ-
mental attitudes. Results substantiate the relevance of the very ﬁrst set of questions in the
survey and provide support to internal validity. Clearly, being a priori in favor of a carbon tax
has a very large eﬀect on acceptance. Being highly concerned about climate issues and paying
(no) attention to energy consumption have a signiﬁcant and economically meaningful impact
on acceptability, consistently with Kallbekken and Sælen (2011). Since the eﬀect of education
disappears once introduced the role of information and concern may suggest that this is rather
driven by information asymmetry than a diﬀerence in discounting.
Trust in the ability of fellow-citizens to reduce energy consumption is associated with a
positive eﬀect on acceptability. Although the formulation of this variable is strictly related to
energy consumption and does not recall the common wording used by large surveys such as the
World Values Survey, we relate this result with the recent strand of research in the theory of
collective action arguing that generalized trust may be a positive determinant of cooperative
behavior in global dilemmas as with local commons (see e.g. Nyborg et al. 2006; Ostrom 2009;
Carattini et al. 2013). That is, policy and individual behavior may go rather hand in hand than
crowd out (Gowdy 2008; Ostrom 2009).
Trust in the ability of foreign citizens to reduce energy consumption has instead no impact
on acceptability. Despite the weight given in the literature to competitiveness eﬀects, it seems
that here climate change mitigation may be rather perceived as a domestic issue. That is,
conditional cooperation may be coupled with elements of Kantian responsibility, supporting the
rise of unilateral policy (cf. Roemer 2010).
Unsurprisingly, trust in the government engenders higher acceptability (cf. Kirchgassner and
Schneider 2003; Ostrom 2009). Government behavior represents indeed an additional source
of uncertainty in the context of climate change. For instance citizens may be disappointed
when looking at eﬀective emissions reductions compared with government's rhetoric (Mitchell
and Woodman 2010). Citizens may perceive environmental taxes essentially as a mean to raise
additional ﬁscal revenues (Dresner et al. 2006; Kallbekken et al. 2011). Our result thus conﬁrms
the previous evidence of Kallbekken and Sælen (2011).
Column (3) introduces variables speciﬁcally related to carbon taxation and in particular
opinions on its potential beneﬁcialand detrimental eﬀects. The coeﬃcients of column (2) are
generally robust to this new speciﬁcation. Government: information now reaches signiﬁcance,
psuggesting the perception of a complementarity between information and taxation. According
to the focus group in Kallbekken and Aasen (2010), information campaigns should accompany
the implementation of climate policy providing knowledge on its instruments and not only raising
awareness on climate change (see also Brannlund and Persson 2012).
The eﬀect related with tax eﬀectiveness, including perceived co-beneﬁts, is striking. If the
tax is expected to be eﬀective in reducing emissions acceptability rises of about 30%. The impact
of co-beneﬁts on acceptability has a similar magnitude, since this variable represents the number
of co-beneﬁts recognized by respondents and thus ranges from 0 to 8. The estimate is also
positive for expecting an eﬀect on themselves, based on question 10. Hence, we provide strong
support to the fresh literature on the perceived eﬀectiveness of carbon taxes and its linkages
with acceptability. That is, we link our ﬁnding with the emphasis on the lack of understanding
of incentive eﬀects provided by Dresner et al. (2006), with Bristow et al. (2010), which ﬁnd that
the acceptability of a given carbon tax design can be inﬂuenced by how agents perceive the
instrument as eﬀective, and with Brouwer et al. (2008), who point to a signiﬁcant and positive
eﬀect of perceiving a hypothetical carbon travel tax as eﬀective on travelers willingness-to-pay
for carbon compensation (see also Kallbekken and Sælen 2011 on the acceptability of fuel taxes
and Steg et al. 2006; Kallbekken and Aasen 2010; Sælen and Kallbekken 2011).
The coeﬃcient for crowding-out of intrinsic motivation or protest answers does not attain
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statistical signiﬁcance. This may suggest that what we face is indeed some motivational crowding-
out rather than simply protest, although with no impact on acceptability.
Regarding the perceived policy drawbacks, all included variables have the expected negative
sign, but only loss of purchasing power and risk of being jobless are signiﬁcant. Being one of
the 67% of the sample aﬃrming that carbon taxes are an issue for purchasing power is linked
with 11% lower probability of accepting the instrument. The concern of losing purchasing power
makes sense in particular given that the use of tax revenues is not yet speciﬁed in the question-
naire. However, this concern may vanish over time after carbon taxes are implemented, since
the real eﬀect of loss in consumption on well-being may be lower than actually perceived, as
income relative to others may be rather unchanged (Gowdy 2008, see also Howarth 2006). Not
surprisingly, being in the 5% concerned about their job is associated with a 25% lower probability
of acceptance.
Regressive impacts do not seem to matter, although the p-value is 11.5%. Distributional ef-
fects are an issue for an important number of individuals as indicated in the descriptive statistics,
but they fail to signiﬁcantly impact policy acceptability. Our results diﬀer thus from those of
Thalmann (2004), wherein the probability of a yes-vote for a green proposal is substantially lower
for those bills implying a clear increase in inequalities, of Bristow et al. (2010), whose survey
data shows a marked preference for a carbon credit up to 4 tons of CO2 per capita to reduce
distributional eﬀects and of Kallbekken et al. 2011, whose laboratory evidence suggests a marked
preference for fair distribution of payoﬀs between polluters and victims (see also Brannlund and
Persson 2012). We may see an explanation in the focus group of Kallbekken and Aasen (2010),
whose respondents seem to be concerned by distributional eﬀects but not enough to pretend
environmental taxes not to be regressive (cf. also Kallbekken and Sælen 2011).
Competitiveness and employment eﬀects are clearly non-signiﬁcant and thus absent from
Table 7. We see three possible explanations for their non-signiﬁcance. First, individuals may not
care of competitiveness issues, consumers having diﬀerent interests than ﬁrms, and of employ-
ment, since they may have very small empathy for potential jobless and perhaps limited fear of
how rising levels of unemployment could aﬀect their situation. This may be however in contra-
diction with the evidence based on voting behavior provided by Thalmann (2004), whichsuggests
that almost every citizen in his sample is concerned about employment issues, even at a time
when structural unemployment in Switzerland was almost nonexistent (unemployment rate was
below 2%). Second, individuals may not expect competitiveness eﬀects to be suﬃciently large to
become a real concern. This may make sense in the light of the modeling exercise of Sceia et al.
(2012), which ﬁnd very limited terms-of-trade eﬀects for Switzerland when simulating the im-
pact of unilateral moves towards more stringent climate policy. Third, respondents may expect
Swiss climate policy to be part of a concerted action plan undertaken with other countries, e.g.
under the umbrella of a renewed Kyoto-like agreement. In such scenario, terms-of-trade eﬀects
as modeled by Sceia et al. (2012) become positive. Yet, if this is the case, we may be surprised
to not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect of trust in foreign agents on acceptability. At any rate, this
evidence may question the rationale for the large exemptions and privileges given to some in-
dustries by carbon schemes in some Scandinavian countries or Australia, which eventually water
down the environmental impact of the tax itself (see Lin and Li 2011). The very low concern for
employment and competitiveness eﬀect may also be due to the low proﬁle of corporate interest
groups at the time of the survey. Indeed, the latter may employ massive lobbying eﬀorts to have
their vested interests internalized by the public leading so that approaching important votes the
industry ﬂight argument tend to gain a very important weight in the political discourse (Spash
and Lo 2012).
Regarding the relative performance of the three speciﬁcations, we see that the goodness
of ﬁt increases as more variables are added, conﬁrming that policy perception does matter for
acceptability, beside individual characteristics. McFadden's pseudo R2 reaches 27% in column
(3) and data inspection indicates that even including all non-signiﬁcant variables commented
here it would not exceed 30%.
3.2 Impact of earmarking on carbon tax acceptability
In this section, we focus on the individuals that do not accept the policy proposal in question 15
and examine whether their choice is diﬀerent in question 18, conditional on the implementation
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of their preferred option of revenue recycling. The variable to be explained takes value 1 for
those changing opinion in favor of the CT/CC and 0 otherwise. We then rely again on a probit
model, conditional on choosing 0 in question 15:
Prob(Acceptability = 1|x,Q15 = 0) = F (x, β) (4)
Revenue recycling is introduced as a dummy variable representing respondent's ﬁrst choice
among the three options for recycling presented in the questionnaire. We select tax rebates to
households and ﬁrms as the reference case. The marginal eﬀects are calculated as in (2) and (3).
The estimation reported in Table 7 recalls the models of Table 6 and includes variables for
revenue recycling obtained from question 17 and labeling, now signiﬁcant. The literature provides
no priors on the potential impact of socioeconomic characteristics on acceptability conditional
upon speciﬁed use of tax revenues. We ﬁnd that none is statistically signiﬁcant. Instead, a series
of policy-relevant variables display interesting results in presence of earmarking. Trust in the
government is associated with a negative sign and a fairly large coeﬃcient. This makes sense
in the light of the positive coeﬃcient of Table 6. Indeed, those that are in favor of the CT/CC
regardless of how tax revenues are used signal trust in the government. On the contrary, respon-
dents distrusting the government are relatively more likely to reject the proposal of question 15
and potentially change opinion in Table 7, once revenues are earmarked. This is consistent with
the literature which points to distrust as one of the major reasons explaining the demand for
earmarking, see Kallbekken and Aasen (2010) for a review.
Compared to the rest of respondents, those suggesting that the government should address
the issue of energy consumption with taxation (6c) do not have a higher probability to change
their opinion from question 15 to 18. This is consistent with the eﬀect of unconditional support
to the tax as expressed in question 6 to unconditional acceptability as given by question 15. In
contrast, positive answers to 6a (informing and raising awareness to reduce energy consumption)
are again associated with an increase in acceptability. That is, those wanting the government to
communicate better the need and possibilities to reduce energy consumption are, everything else
equal, more likely to support the tax both unconditionally and conditionally. This may point
again to the need for complementarity between taxation and communication.
The eﬀect of perceived eﬀectiveness is consistent with the results of Table 6. Expecting the
tax to work is linked to a positive eﬀect on acceptability, also among those that rejected the ﬁrst
CT/CC proposal in question 15, arguably for other reasons. As shown by Kallbekken and Aasen
(2010), being aware of how the incentive eﬀect works does not necessarily imply no demand for
earmarking. The marginal eﬀect in Table 7 is pretty large and implies that in this sub-sample
the likelihood of voting yes once the use of revenue is deﬁned is 74% larger for those believing
the CT/CC to work than for those that do not. Albeit positive, the coeﬃcient for co-beneﬁts
does not reach instead statistical signiﬁcance.
We observe that the probability of reconsidering the CT/CC at question 19 is larger for those
selecting recycling for environmental purposes than for those opting for tax rebates, everything
else equal. The coeﬃcient for recycling through social cushioning (as deﬁned in question 16)
is not statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, it seems that earmarking for environmental purposes
really matters for acceptability. Since we control for e.g. trust in the government and perceived
eﬀectiveness, we relate this demand for environmental recycling with the so-called issue-linkage,
i.e. the need for the public to see a straightforward and logical nexus between the tax and the
use of revenues (Sælen and Kallbekken 2011). At a given tax rate as in this context, this implies
larger abatements in the way to neutrality, conﬁrming that acceptability goes hand in hand
with eﬀectiveness (cf. Steg and Vlek 2009). We recall however that the descriptive statistics
provide evidence of a positive demand for social cushioning, even though with no impact on
acceptability. Therefore, policymakers may want to couple the funding of environmental projects
with social cushioning, e.g. by subsidizing public transportation as with Quebec's carbon tax
(Hahn 2009). Actually, this type of public intervention is strongly supported in this survey and
may explain the dominance of recycling through ﬁnancing for environmental purposes, since this
broad concept may be seen as including public transportation. Another option would be to mix
two (or more) types of revenue recycling or introduce tax thresholds (see e.g. Pezzey and Jotzo
2013), although this may be costly in terms of understanding, transparency and administrative
burden. A compelling solution may rely on implementing measures of social cushioning with
resources coming from the general budget and to leave tax revenues free to deliver tangible
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contribution to the environment, possibly local and visible. Measures of social cushioning may
not even need to depend on climate policy, but be simply linked to energy prices, thus addressing
also other issues such as the nuclear phase-out. In this sense, lump-sum transfers to households
should not be excluded, provided that their progressive eﬀect could be eﬀectively marketed. At
the end of the day these adjustments would probably not imply substantial additional burden
for the government but may provide to be very eﬀective for policy acceptability.
Finally, we look at labeling. The coeﬃcient for CC (versus CT) is now signiﬁcant. The fact
that labeling aﬀects acceptability only in conjunction with revenue recycling may hint that the
term climate contribution may not overcome some general suspicion in question 15, but it does
increase support when earmarking is made explicit. That is, the wording tax seems to reduce
acceptability as in Brannlund and Persson (2012, cf. also Kallbekken et al. 2011). As opined,
with CC individuals may feel endowed with a state of climate which could be worsened with
no contribution, consistently with Gowdy and Erickson (2005) and the seminal contributions of
Thaler (1980) and Kahneman and Tversky (2000). However, chances of wording to matter may
decrease in the political arena, with repeated debates and the intervention of political parties,
although based on Swiss data Buetler and Maréchal (2007) call for evidence of framing eﬀect in
voting behavior.
4 Conclusions
Carbon taxes are an eﬀective instrument for curbing greenhouse gas emissions, yet are seldom
implemented (Baranzini and Carattini 2013). This paper analyzes drivers and barriers to public
acceptability of carbon taxes. Empirical results suggest that a carbon tax could ﬁnd substantial
support in a ballot, but it may not reach the majority without explicit earmarking. Albeit
the political discourse generally focuses on competitiveness and distributional eﬀects (cf. e.g.
Spash and Lo 2012), the data analyzed here indicate that individuals are more concerned by the
eﬀectiveness of the tax than on such drawbacks. Competitiveness eﬀects are almost completely
neglected, whereas distributional issues seem to represent a real concern, but with limited impact
on acceptability. Perceived ineﬀectiveness represents one of the main obstacles to acceptability.
According to our ﬁndings, communicating both primary and ancillary beneﬁts of carbon taxes
seems also to be essential for improving acceptability. Along with earmarking, this could provide
very useful to reduce the opposition related to mistrust in the government and Ramsey-type tax
aversion (see Kallbekken et al. 2011). Indeed, we ﬁnd that in terms of acceptability the best way
of recycling is to give the priority to environmental spending. In the same vein, we also provide
evidence that using a diﬀerent label, viz. climate contribution rather than carbon tax, may
boost acceptability under some conditions. We relate this ﬁnding with the status-quo bias largely
discussed by Kahneman and Tversky (2000). We also ﬁnd that trust in other people in country
is associated with higher probability of acceptance, in line with the intuition of Ostrom (2009)
and Carattini et al. (2013). However, it is still unclear how trust can be addressed although some
research is moving in this direction (see e.g. Steg and Vlek 2009).
In sum our empirical ﬁndings seem providing evidence that with appropriate design the
chances for climate policy tightening can be substantially improved. Although our data from
Geneva may not ensure full countrywide representativity, our results may hint that the Swiss
population may be now ready to accept ambitious energy and climate policy of the kind rejected
in 2000, provided that policies are properly conceived. Transposability of survey estimates to
real decisions needs however to take into account the room for hypothetical bias and variation
in timing, which is linked to media coverage, lobbying and business-cycles eﬀects.
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Tables
Table 1: Socioeconomic characteristics: sample's summary statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dec.) Min. Max. N
Gender (male) 0.521 (0.5) 0 1 336
Age 36.860 (14.04) 19 85 336
Years of education 15.782 (1.935) 11 18 330
Categories of income 4.029 (1.816) 1 7 239
Labor market (active) 0.949 (0.221) 0 1 332
Number of adults in the household 2.306 (1.194) 0 6 337
Number of kids in the household 0.333 (0.681) 0 4 291
Homeowner 0.223 (0.417) 0 1 336
Number of cars 1.279 (0.957) 0 4 337
Source: Own computations.
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Table 2: Questions and answers: energy consumption
Question and answers N
1. To what extent do you pay attention to your energy consumption?
In a very large extent 20% 337
In a large extent 53% 337
In a small extent 22% 337
No attention at all 5% 337
2. Do you feel that you should reduce your energy consumption?*
a. To save money 77% 338
b. For the climate and the environment 59% 338
c. If other people do it too 6% 338
d. If other countries do it too 6% 338
e. No reason to do it 6% 338
f. I do my best already 7% 338
3. How much should the price of the following energy vectors change to lead you to reduce your consumption of 10%?
a. Gasoline 23.40% 292
b. Electricity 27.68% 297
c. Heating fuels 24.59% 288
4. (5.) Do you think that the other Swiss citizens (countries) are ready to reduce their energy consumption?
Trust in people in country 76% 242
Trust in foreign agents 52% 247
6. Should the Swiss government intervene to reduce energy consumption?*
a. Informing and raising awareness 73% 337
b. Subsidizing public transports 61% 338
c. Taxing CO2 35% 338
d. No need for regulation 3% 338
e. Not concerned 2% 337
7. In the next 10 years, do you expect the price of the following energy vectors to change of:
a Gasoline 27% 331
b Electricity 16% 334
c Heating fuels 18% 335
8. Speaking your mind, which of the following drivers could lead to higher energy prices?
Climate policy tightening 58% 337
Resource scarcity 89% 337
Nuclear exit 50% 337
Preference for renewable energy 53% 337
9. What public policies would you like to see implemented to deal with energy price increases, if any?*
a. Awareness-raising campaigns 63% 338
b. Subsidies for all households 18% 338
c. Subsidies for poor households 38% 338
d. Subsidies for rural households 10% 338
e. Tax rebates for all households 17% 338
f. Tax rebates for poor households 25% 338
g. Tax rebates for rural households 7% 338
h. Improving public transports 62% 338
Source: Own computations. Note: Questions 1 to 9. Questions 10 to 19 below. *Multiple answers are possible.
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Table 3: Questions and answers: carbon tax and climate contribution
Question and answers N
10. Do you think that a CT/CC would aﬀect your energy consumption?
Less consumption 56% 338
No change 37% 338
More consumption 7% 338
11. Do you think that a CT/CC could achieve energy consumption reductions for Switzerland?
The tax is eﬀective 48% 338
12. What are the advantages of a CT/CC that come to your mind?
For the respondent only Only for the society For both
a. Better air quality 10% 26% 20% 320
b. Less congestion 7% 14% 6% 320
c. Health improvement 16% 11% 15% 320
d. Less road accidents 5% 10% 3% 320
13. What drawbacks do you see for your household linked with a CT/CC?*
a. Less purchasing power 67% 338
b. Less comfort 34% 338
c. Fear of losing the job 5% 338
d. No drawbacks 22% 338
14. What drawbacks do you see for the Swiss society linked with a CT/CC?*
a. Less purchasing power 69% 338
b. Loss of competitiveness 20% 338
c. Distributional eﬀects on the poor 46% 338
d. Rise in unemployment 11% 338
e. Inequality city-countryside 25% 338
f. No drawbacks 11% 338
15. Despite these drawbacks (from questions 13 and 14), would you accept a CT/CC ?
Acceptability despite drawbacks 49% 338
Source: Own computations. Note: See Table 5 for question 15 onward. *Multiple answers are possible.
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Table 4: Questions and answers: policy design (carbon tax/climate contribution)
Question and answers N
16. Should CT/CC policy negative eﬀects on the following categories be compensated?*
a. Low-income households (<50'000 CHF/year) 72% 333
b. Middle-income households (50'000-100'000 CHF/year) 48% 333
c. High-income households (>100'000 CHF/year) 14% 333
d. Rural households 35% 333
e. Urban households 19% 333
f. Large families 49% 333
g. Older people 58% 333
h. Firms 24% 333
17. Rank the following ways of revenue recycling (best to worst)
First Second Third
a. Redistribution towards most aﬀected households 26% 32% 20% 313
b. Tax rebate for households and ﬁrms 11% 34% 35% 313
c. Financing environmental projects, renewables 60% 21% 11% 313
18. Would you accept a CT\CC if revenues would be used as chosen in question 17 (and 16)?
Acceptability conditional on revenue recycling 64% 337
19. If you would be asked to vote on the CT\CC, what energy price increase would you be willing to accept?
0% 0%-5% 5%-10% 10%-15% 15%-20% 20%-25% 25%-30%
Tax rate 13% 30% 31% 16% 5% 2% 2% 330
Source: Own computations. Note: *Multiple answers are possible.
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Table 6: Testing carbon tax/climate contribution acceptability: marginal eﬀects at me-
dian from probit estimation
Question 15 (1) (2) (3)
Number of cars -0.073** -0.053* -0.061*
(0.029) (0.032) (0.033)
Green member 0.275*** 0.205** 0.191**
(0.074) (0.094) (0.094)
Years of education 0.028** 0.014 0.012
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Climate: high concern 0.161*** 0.136**
(0.061) (0.067)
Energy consumption: no attention -0.334*** -0.375***
(0.126) (0.100)
Trust in other people in country 0.107* 0.077
(0.062) (0.066)
Trust in the government 0.210* 0.118
(0.111) (0.134)
Government intervention: information 0.094 0.124*
(0.070) (0.071)
Government intervention: taxation 0.269*** 0.222***
(0.062) (0.069)
CT/CC: eﬀect on own behavior 0.174**
(0.072)
CT/CC: crowding-out or protest answers -0.053
(0.124)
CT/CC: eﬀectiveness 0.284***
(0.068)
CT/CC: co-beneﬁts 0.028*
(0.017)
CT/CC: drawbacks (less purchasing power) -0.165**
(0.076)
CT/CC: drawbacks (fear of losing job) -0.258*
(0.142)
CT/CC: drawbacks (distributional eﬀects on the poor) -0.104
(0.065)
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.17 0.27
Log pseudolikelihood -214.504 -185.982 -163.533
N 327 325 325
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 . In all columns p>Chi2 =
0.0000.
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Table 7: Carbon tax/climate contribution acceptability with earmarking and revenue
recycling: marginal eﬀects at median from probit estimation
Question 18 | Question 15=0 (1)
Trust in the government -0.314*
(0.155)
Government intervention: information 0.184**
(0.088)
Government intervention: taxation 0.184
(0.088)
CT/CC: eﬀectiveness 0.273***
(0.092)
CT/CC: co-beneﬁts 0.040
(0.027)
CT/CC: drawbacks (less purchasing power) 0.105
(0.096)
CT/CC: drawbacks (fear of losing job) -0.252***
(0.095)
CT/CC: drawbacks (distributional eﬀects on the poor) 0.022
(0.092)
Revenue recycling: social cushioning 0.067
(0.123)
Revenue recycling: environmental projects 0.205*
(0.123)
Labeling (climate contribution) 0.185**
(0.091)
Pseudo R2 0.18
Log pseudolikelihood -85.340
N 152
Note: Coeﬃcients and goodness of ﬁt are computed with the inclusion of the following socioeconomic variables:
gender, age, education (years of), green member, number of cars, homeowner, unemployed. None of them is
statistically signiﬁcant. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 .
p>Chi2=0.0020.
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